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Abstract 
 
Studies have found that people are overconfident in estimation involving difficult tasks 
but underconfident in easy tasks. Conversely, they are overconfident in placing 
themselves in easy tasks but underconfident in hard tasks. Moore and Healy (2008) 
explain these findings by a regression hypothesis that we test in four experiments. The   
hypothesis successfully predicts estimation behavior. However, for placement (involving 
both easy and hard tasks) we find no overconfidence, regression effects due to low and 
high anchor points, and extreme underconfidence (when people choose between multiple 
alternatives).  We further test a Bayesian model of reactions to signals about absolute 
performance when success depends on relative performance and find behavior consistent 
with this model. Finally, since placement judgments are important in many competitive 
settings, we stress the need for more research to identify their determinants.  
 
JEL codes: D8, L0, M1 
PsycINFO codes:  2340, 3040 
Keywords:  Overconfidence, estimation, placement, “better-than-average” effects. 
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Overconfidence is a central topic of research in judgment and decision making as well as 
behavioral economics (see, e.g., Plous, 1993; Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). In an important 
contribution, Moore and Healy (2008) recently clarified much of this extensive research 
by identifying different paradigms as well as the conceptual meaning of the term 
“overconfidence” itself.  In particular, Moore and Healy distinguished three ways in 
which overconfidence is used.   
First, people can be overconfident in estimating their ability to do something. For 
example, a person might overestimate his ability to run a Marathon within a certain time. 
Moore and Healy call this overestimation. Interestingly, overestimation is not universal. 
A robust finding is that people tend to overestimate their own skill on hard tasks but 
underestimate it on easy tasks (Burson, Larrick, & Klayman, 2006; Moore & Cain, 2007).   
Second, a person might express overconfidence in ability relative to others; for 
example, the belief that one can run the Marathon faster than, say, 80% of a specific 
population.  Moore and Healy call this overplacement.  It is also referred to as the “better-
than-average” effect whereby people judge their abilities in familiar domains such as 
driving as being superior to that of the “average” person (Svenson, 1981). At the same 
time, however, there is a tendency to judge oneself as below average in unfamiliar and, 
therefore, hard tasks such as juggling (Kruger, 1999). Also, as Hoelzl and Rustichini 
(2005) demonstrate, this type of overconfidence may be moderated when people are 
required to make incentive-compatible choices as opposed to expressing opinions.  
Third, people can be overconfident when estimating future uncertainty; for 
example, when providing confidence intervals for forecasts of, say, sales that 
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subsequently turn out to be too narrow (see, e.g., Alpert & Raiffa, 1982; Klayman et al., 
1999). Moore and Healy call this overprecision.  
Although much needs to be done to achieve a better understanding of 
overprecision (Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007), this paper concentrates on 
overestimation and overplacement and, in particular, considers the relation between them. 
This is an especially important consideration in competitive environments where success 
depends on rank in a population (i.e., how able relative to others) but where the decision 
maker may only have information about absolute level. As examples, consider 
entrepreneurs facing novel business opportunities, firms confronting research and 
development expenditures, the structure of many career choices, or even students 
considering which new courses to take. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Interestingly, Moore and Healy (2008) suggest that systematic errors in estimation 
and placement might arise from random errors in judgment. To understand why, assume 
that in estimating performance a person’s judgments are subject to random error and 
consider the types of errors that are likely to be observed across a range of tasks that vary 
from hard to easy.  This can be depicted by the relation between estimated and true 
performance shown in Figure 1 – the heavy line. When tasks are difficult, error implies 
that people overestimate their performance. When tasks are easy, error implies that 
people underestimate their performance (see also Dawes & Mulford, 1996; Erev, 
Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994). 
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What happens when people judge the performance of others?  Assume, first, that 
these judgments are also subject to error and that people generally have less information 
about others than themselves. Thus, there will be more error associated with judgments of 
others than of oneself, and the relation between estimated and true performance for others 
will be flatter than that for oneself – see dotted line in Figure 1.  Comparing the two lines, 
it can be seen that, for difficult tasks, people will underplace themselves relative to 
others; for easy tasks, they will overplace themselves.  
This “regression” hypothesis makes strong and simple predictions.  When people 
overestimate their ability in a specific, difficult task, they should also underplace 
themselves. Thus, for example, a track athlete who overestimates her performance in a 
particular difficult event would be expected to underplace herself relative to competitors 
in the same event (assuming, of course, that she does not have excellent information 
about her competitors).  Conversely, when people underestimate their ability in a specific 
simple task, they should also overplace themselves.  Using the athlete example again, 
overestimation for a simple event should be accompanied by underplacement.   
The main purpose of this paper is to test the regression hypothesis. Is the 
asymmetry between estimation and placement observed when people face the same 
tasks?  Moreover, if the asymmetry does not exist, what moderates patterns that are 
observed?    
A related issue considers what impact information relevant to estimation has on 
decisions concerning placement.  Can knowledge about one be informative about the 
other and, if so, do people make such inferences appropriately?  For example, if you 
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know your score on a test, can you use this information to make a decision that depends 
on placement (i.e., when assessing your score relative to others)?    
Our goal is to investigate these two issues experimentally. The paper is organized 
as follows. In the next section we introduce the experimental paradigm used to test 
whether people exhibit over- or underplacement and/or over- and under-estimation in the 
same task (a general knowledge quiz). The paradigm also permits investigation of how 
people update judgments of their relative level of performance after receiving 
information about their absolute level.  Moreover, we specify a Bayesian model of this 
process as a behavioral benchmark. This is followed by presenting the results of four 
experiments.   
In brief, our first two experiments demonstrate that even if people are over- or 
underconfident in the sense of estimation, their choices reveal no bias in terms of 
placement.  In addition, people generally update their judgments about placement in 
accordance with the Bayesian model. In our third experiment, we extend our 
investigation by considering placement decisions that are tailored to individual 
performance. In the fourth experiment, participants were required to rank order four 
alternatives instead of choosing between two. In doing so, they exhibited underplacement 
irrespective of whether they were also over- or underconfident in the sense of estimation.  
We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings.   
 
The experimental paradigm 
Our experimental paradigm has seven basic features. First, participants answer a 
multiple-choice test where their remuneration depends on how many questions they 
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answer correctly. Second, they guess their scores (thereby allowing us to estimate over- 
or underconfidence in terms of estimation).  
Third, participants choose between six pairs of 2-outcome gambles each of which 
involves monetary gains and losses. In one gamble in each pair, the probability of 
winning is 0.50. In the other gamble, this probability is unspecified but participants are 
told that it reflects their relative test score. Specifically, the probability of winning is 
equal to the percentile of the score in the group (e.g., a score at the 0.80 percentile 
translates into a 0.80 probability).  Clearly, if participants believe that their score exceeds 
(falls short of) the 0.50 fractile, they should choose the gamble with the unspecified 
(0.50) probabilities.  Participants’ choices therefore provide behavioral tests for over- or 
underplacement at the group level. 
Fourth, participants are given feedback in the form of their absolute test scores. 
Fifth, participants are required to choose again between the same six gambles. 
Since they now know their absolute test scores, we can observe how this affects their 
placement (i.e., how knowledge of absolute level affects judgments of relative levels). 
Sixth, participants are remunerated by the sum of (a) a small, fixed show-up fee, 
(b) according to the number of questions answered correctly in the quiz, and (c) the 
outcome associated with one of their twelve choices selected at random. 
The seventh feature is that there are two versions of the quiz, one “hard” and one 
“easy” that are used to induce over- and underestimation, respectively, in two groups in 
each experiment.  
Placement based on knowledge of one’s absolute score.  At first thought, one 
might think that knowledge about the absolute score on the test should have no impact on 
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a person’s assessment of relative performance. To support this idea, consider how 
students graded “on a curve” should interpret their absolute scores on a test.  A student, it 
is argued, should pay no attention to her absolute score since she is ignorant of the 
distribution of scores of the other students (cf., Windschitl, Kruger, & Simms, 20031). 
However, a deeper analysis of this problem leads to a different conclusion. (See 
also, Moore & Cain, 2007; Moore & Healy, 2008). Assume that the student characterizes 
the scores of the population with whom comparisons will be made by the random 
variable, X, and that what matters is where her score lies relative to the mean of this 
distribution. Assume further that she has a prior distribution over μ, the mean of X, 
denoted by p(μ).   
Now, the student learns her own score, x.  This can be characterized by the 
likelihood function p(x|μ,σo2) where σo2 is the (assumed known) variance of the 
distribution. Using Bayes’ theorem, the signal or score received by the student can be 
used to update the prior distribution over μ, that is 
p(μ| x,σo2)  p(μ). p(x|μ,σo2)          (1) 
where “ ” means “is proportional to.”  If the prior and likelihood functions involve 
normal distributions, it can be shown that the mean of the posterior distribution (the left 
hand side of Equation 1) is 
Eμ = α x + (1-a)μ                      (2) 
where α = {σa2/(σa2 + σo2)} is the ratio of the variance of the prior distribution (σa2) to 
the sum of the variances of the prior and likelihood (see, e.g., Zellner, 1971). 
                                                 
1 However, we note that these researchers have in mind a somewhat different paradigm where the 
information about the test score (e.g., easy conditions) is common to all participants.  
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This is clearly an “as if” model that involves various technical assumptions. 
However, its qualitative implications are that the student’s best updated estimate of the 
mean score in the population is a weighted average of her prior “guess” and her own 
score.  Thus, her best estimate of the mean will always lie between these two quantities, 
that is, be bigger (smaller) than the prior when her own score is bigger (smaller) but not 
as big (small) as her own score.  In particular, note that to the extent that there is less 
variation in X (or σo2 is small), more weight should be given to own score.   
Finally, in one of our experiments we test what happens when participants’ 
probabilities of success do not depend on their own performance but rather on that of 
another participant selected at random. How should a participant take account of 
feedback concerning her own performance in this case?  Here, we note that although the 
participant is aware of her own performance, she does not know the performance of the 
randomly selected participant.  However, following the logic given above, she can update 
her estimate of mean performance and use that as the expected performance of a 
randomly selected participant.  But since the performance of the randomly selected 
participant is just as likely to be above or below the updated median, the participant 
making the decision has no reason to change from what she did prior to receiving 
feedback about her own particular performance. 
 
Experimental evidence 
Experiment 1 
Design.  We sought to answer two issues.  The first was whether participants who 
were over- or underconfident in terms of estimation would take decisions that implied 
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over- or underconfidence in terms of placement. The second was whether participants’ 
choices after receiving feedback would be in accordance with the Bayesian model 
outlined above. The design of the experiment followed our experimental paradigm.   
To address the first issue, we constituted two groups of participants at random. 
One had to choose between two possible answers for each question of the general 
knowledge quiz (the “easy” condition); the other had to choose between five possible 
answers (the “hard” condition). Both groups faced the same time limit of 45 seconds to 
answer each question.   Based on results in the literature (see, e.g., Burson et al., 2006), 
we hypothesized that the group in the hard (easy) condition would be overconfident 
(underconfident) in terms of estimation.      
Procedure. The experiment was conducted in several phases (see also instructions 
in Appendix A). First, participants took a test involving 20 general knowledge and logic 
questions in a multiple choice format. After completing the test, participants were 
required to estimate the number of questions they had answered correctly. (Their 
remuneration depended on the number of correctly answered questions.)   
Second, participants were given the option of leaving the experiment or to 
continue in a task that would involve choosing between gambles where they could 
actually lose money.2  They were informed that, at the end of the experiment, their 
remuneration would depend on playing out the consequences of one of their chosen 
gambles selected at random.      
                                                 
2 The decision to allow participants to leave the experiment was guided by ethical considerations 
concerning the possibility of participants losing money. 
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Third, the participants remaining in the experiment faced a series of six choices 
between gambles.  We refer to these subsequently as the “pre-feedback” choices and 
describe the gambles below. 
Fourth, participants received feedback in the form of their actual (absolute) test 
scores. 
Fifth, the participants chose between the six gambles for a second time albeit in a 
different order. We refer to these subsequently as the “post-feedback” choices. 
Sixth, participants faced the consequences of playing out one of their choices that 
was determined randomly and were remunerated accordingly.  Participants also 
completed a post-experimental questionnaire that inquired, inter alia, how they evaluated 
their scores on the test relative to their fellow participants.    
Choice tasks. Participants were faced with a series of choices between two 
gambles.  One of these provided a 50% chance of winning money and a 50% chance of 
losing money where the expected value was 1€.  The other gamble also involved sums to 
be won or lost but the probabilities were not specified.  Participants were told that their 
individual-specific probabilities depended on their relative performance on the test. 
Each choice could therefore be characterized by a “0.50/0.50” gamble to win or 
lose (w: l) versus unspecified chances to win or lose (w´: l´).  Thus, for example, the 
choice between a 0.50/0.50 gamble paying (3€:-1€) and an unspecified probability 
gamble paying (3€:-1€) can be described by the notation “3:-1 vs. 3:-1” (i.e., 0.50/0.50 
chances on the left, unspecified probabilities on the right).  As noted above, we 
maintained the expected value of all six gambles with known probabilities equal to 1€; 
 11
however, we varied the amounts involved (from 3€:-1€ to 5€:-3€) and whether outcomes 
were symmetric or asymmetric, e.g., “3:-1 vs. 3:-1” or “3:-1 vs. 5:-3.” 
 Participants. Participants were recruited through notices on the campus of 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra and the experiment was conducted in the Leex laboratory 
using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 1999). They were remunerated by a show-up fee, 
how well they answered the test, and the outcome of the randomly selected gamble.    In 
all four experiments reported here we followed these same procedures concerning 
participants. 
 In this experiment, participation involved four groups of fifteen persons where 
two groups received the easy test and two the hard test.  The mean age of participants was 
20.5 (little variance) with almost as many males as females. On average, participants 
earned 7.03 €.    
Results of Experiment 1. The left hand panel of Table 1 reports – separately for 
the sub-groups taking the hard and easy tests – the mean test scores, mean estimated test 
scores, and mean levels of overconfidence. On average, participants who took the hard 
test were overconfident (2.40), whereas those who took the easy test were underconfident 
(-1.85). The difference between these means is significant (t=4.86, p<.001) and consistent 
with previous findings in the literature (see above). 
As noted earlier, both before and after receiving feedback, participants made six 
choices between gambles with, on the one hand, “0.50/0.50” probabilities and, on the 
other hand, unspecified probabilities.  To develop reliable measures of preferences for the 
unspecified options, we coded each choice in binary fashion (unspecified probabilities = 
1, “0.50/0.50” probabilities = 0) and summed these indicators to create an “uncertainty 
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score” by participant.  By definition, the scores can range from 0 to 6 (the larger the 
score, the more often the participants chose gambles with unspecified probabilities). 
Consequently, a score of 3 indicates indifference between the gambles involving 
“0.50/0.50” and unspecified probabilities. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
In Appendix B (top panel), we provide details of all the gambles and the 
proportions of participants preferring the gambles with unspecified probabilities. This 
information is presented both for the hard and easy sub-groups and choices made before 
and after receiving feedback.  We further provide the corresponding mean uncertainty 
scores that are also summarized in the top panel of Table 2 (together with standard 
errors). 
For Experiment 1, the top panel of Table 2 shows – for the pre-feedback choices – 
that the mean uncertainty scores of the hard and easy sub-groups (3.16 and 2.63) are 
neither significantly different from each other (t = 1.05, p = .299) nor different from 3.00 
that represents indifference between the gambles with “0.50/0.50” and unspecified 
probabilities (t = -0.48 and -0.72 for the hard and easy sub-groups, respectively, ns).  In 
other words, there is no over- or underplacement. 
Second, since participants in the hard (easy) condition received on average scores 
that were lower (higher) than their expectations, the Bayesian model predicts that their 
post-feedback decisions will involve choosing the unspecified gambles at a lower 
(higher) rate than the pre-feedback decisions.  This is exactly what the data show. In the 
hard sub-group, the mean uncertainty score decreases from 3.16 to 1.72 (t = 4.04, 
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p<.001). In the easy sub-group, it increases from 2.63 to 3.78 (t = -2.86, p =.008). This 
interaction is further supported by the fact that the beta coefficient of the regression of the 
difference between pre- and post-feedback uncertainty scores on the easy/hard condition 
(coded as a dummy variable) is significant (t = 4.79, p < .001).    
Discussion of Experiment 1. Experiment 1 provides further evidence of the so-
called “hard-easy” effect in estimation (Juslin, 1994; Juslin, Winman, & Olsson, 2000).  
Participants facing the hard test overestimated their ability; those facing the easy test 
underestimated their ability. At the same time, neither group was over- or underconfident 
in their pre-feedback choices in the sense of over- or underplacement.  In other words, 
there was no relation between over- or underestimation and over- or underplacement.  
Second, changes in the participants’ pattern of choices after receiving feedback 
was consistent with the Bayesian model, That is, those in the hard sub-group reduced 
their choices with unspecified probabilities; those in the easy sub-group increased them. 
In the post-experimental questionnaire participants were asked to assess their skill 
in answering the general knowledge questionnaire relative to their peers.  They were 
given five options from “much worse than others” to “much better than others” with a 
mid-point of “similar to others.”  A large majority (76%) checked this latter category. 
Participants were also asked to estimate in quantitative terms their relative position in the 
distribution of scores.  Their mean judgment implied an overall probability of success of 
0.58. Thus, when explicitly asked participants stated that their competence was similar to 
their peers. This response was clearly consistent with their pre-feedback choices.  
Experiment 2 was designed to provide further tests of this point. 
 
 14
Experiment 2 
Design and procedure. We employed the same basic paradigm (gambles and test) 
as in Experiment 1 but with three exceptions. First, we changed the order in which 
participants made their choices and answered the test questionnaires.3 Thus, in 
Experiment 2, the ordering of activities was as follows: (1) instructions; (2) participants 
were offered the chance to leave the experiment if they did not wish to face the 
possibility of losses; (3) choices between gambles; (4) test questionnaire; (5) assessment 
of own score on test; (6) choices between gambles; (7) final questionnaire; and (8) 
payment based on randomly selected choice. 
Second, the change in the order of tasks meant that participants did not receive 
feedback on their absolute test scores before making the second set of choices.  Instead, 
one can argue that taking the test was a form of imperfect feedback (given that they    
chose before taking the test). 
Third, whereas the unspecified probabilities of half of the participants depended 
on their percentile scores in the test (as in Experiment 1), the probabilities for the others 
depended on the percentile score of a randomly selected participant.  In other words, half 
of the participants faced the same situation as those in Experiment 1 (and were informed 
as to how the probabilities had been calculated); the other half was informed that the 
unspecified probabilities were equal to the percentile score of one of their colleagues 
chosen at random.  If – on average – participants are neither over- nor underconfident in 
their ability relative to others, there should be no difference between those choosing on 
                                                 
3 The decision to change the order of tasks was in response to the possibility that the results of Experiment 
1 might be due to order effects. Specifically, in related work Camerer and Lovallo (1999) used the order 
adopted in Experiment 2. 
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the basis of their own scores and those choosing on the basis of randomly selected fellow 
participants (i.e., no over- or underplacement).   
This time, however, the Bayesian model predicts a difference in how participants 
should react to feedback.  Relative to pre-feedback responses, participants choosing 
based on their own performance should shift their post-feedback responses in the manner 
observed in Experiment 1. However, those choosing on the basis of the performance of a 
randomly selected fellow participant would have no reason to change their pre-feedback 
responses.    
As in Experiment 1, half of the participants received the hard version of the test 
questionnaire and half received the easy version.  In summary, participants in Experiment 
2 were assigned at random to four (= 2 x 2) groups composed of two conditions of 
unspecified probabilities (based on own ability or that of a random other) and two levels 
of test difficulty (hard or easy). 
Participants.   There were 57 participants with an average age of 21.6 years; 40% 
were male. On average, participants earned 6.98€.   
Results of Experiment 2. The middle panel of Table 1 shows that participants 
exhibit the “hard-easy” effect for the estimation task whether they make decisions based 
on their own score or that of a randomly selected colleague.  The hard-easy differences 
are significant in both sub-groups (t =4.35 and t =5.13, p<.001). 
Proportions of choices favoring the unspecified probabilities made by participants 
in each of the four experimental conditions – pre- and post-feedback – are detailed in the 
middle section of Appendix B. The upper middle section of Table 2 summarizes the 
mean uncertainty scores.   
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These data show, first, for the pre-feedback choices there are no differences 
between the hard and easy sub-groups in both the “own score” and “random other” 
conditions (2.93 vs. 3.06, t = -0.22, p = 0.828; and 3.31 vs. 2.69, t = 0.95, p = 0.352). 
Moreover, there are no differences overall between the own score and random other 
conditions (3.00 vs. 3.00, t = 0.00, p = 0.999) which, of course, are also not significantly 
different from 3.00. In other words, these data provide no evidence of over- or 
underplacement whether participants are in the hard or easy sub-groups, on the one hand, 
or choose based on their own score or that of a randomly selected colleague. 
Second, as in Experiment 1, the mean uncertainty scores for the post-feedback 
choices are smaller than their pre-feedback counterparts in the hard sub-group but larger 
in the easy sub-group. However unlike Experiment 1, with one exception these 
differences are not statistically significant (2.93 vs. 2.60, t = 0.64; 3.06 vs. 3.13, t= -0.22; 
3.31 vs. 3.08, t= 0.76; but 2.69 vs. 3.46, t= -2.99, p = .011).   
Testing for interactions by regressing the difference between pre- and post-
feedback scores on, first, treatment (own score vs. random other) and condition 
(hard/easy) reveals no significant beta coefficients (t = 1.12 and 1.84, respectively, ns).  
However, repeating the same regression on condition (hard/easy) but within treatments, 
the coefficient for hard/easy is not significant for own score (t= 0.68) but is significant in 
the random other treatment (t=2.52, p= .019). 
Interpreting these results within the Bayesian logic outlined above, we note that 
participants in the own score condition exhibited changes pre- to post-feedback that were 
consistent with the Bayesian model albeit statistically insignificant (see also further 
below).  Participants in the random other condition, on the other hand, exhibited 
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statistically significant changes that violated the “no change” prediction of the Bayesian 
model.   
Discussion of Experiment 2. Experiment 2 replicates the important result of 
Experiment 1, namely: over- or underestimation due to hard and easy tests is not 
accompanied by overconfidence in the form of over- or underplacement. Moreover, this 
finding is replicated even when the order of tasks has been changed (i.e., of taking the 
test and the first set of choices) and when participants use the probabilities of a randomly 
assigned other to make their choices as opposed to their own probabilities.   
Experiment 2 does not replicate the results of Experiment 1 with respect to 
feedback for the own score sub-group. However, whereas the feedback in Experiment 1 
was definitive – actual absolute test scores – in Experiment 2 it was imperfect, simply 
taking the test.  Thus, if there were to be any effect, one would expect it to be much 
weaker.   
As to the random other sub-group, the data indicated significant pre- to post-
feedback shifts that were similar to those exhibited in Experiment 1. However, this time 
the Bayesian model predicted no change.  In correctly judging themselves, on average, as 
similar to a random other, it would seem that our participants “over-generalized” this 
thinking when reacting to the feedback of actually taking the test. 
Although participants in Experiment 2 were offered the chance to leave the 
experiment prior to taking gambles, none elected to do so. We speculate this may have 
occurred because the first set of choices was made before participants had answered the 
quiz that determined their probabilities of success. 
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Behavior in terms of placement was consistent with statements made in the post-
experimental questionnaire. Seventy-four percent of participants stated that their skill in 
answering the test was “similar to others.”  Moreover, in evaluating their relative position 
in the distribution of scores, the overall mean percentile estimate was 0.45. 
In Experiments 1 and 2 placement decisions were essentially made against a 
single reference point of 0.50 or the median of the performance distributions.  
Experiment 3 therefore sought to extend the experimental paradigm by exploring the 
effects of different reference points or fractiles of the performance distribution. 
 
Experiment 3 
Design, procedure, and choice tasks. Experiment 3 was exactly like Experiment 1 
with one exception.  When participants faced choices between known and unspecified 
probabilities, the known probabilities were not all stated to be “0.50/0.50” (“win/loss”). 
Instead, these were tailored for each participant so that they were equal to their individual 
unspecified probabilities which, as in Experiment 1, depended on how well they had 
answered the quiz compared to their fellow participants. Thus, for example, a participant 
whose test score was at the 0.65 fractile of the distribution would be faced with a choice 
between known probabilities of “0.65/0.35” and unspecified probabilities.  (Participants 
were not informed that the known probabilities were a function of their own 
performance.)   
Of particular interest is how participants act when faced with high (p > 0.50) as 
opposed to low (p ≤ 0.50) known probabilities.   Assume, for example, that a participant 
starts with a prior that she is no different from the median peer. Imagine that, on taking 
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the test, she feels she does well and that her performance is better than most. From a 
rational perspective, she should combine this signal with her prior thereby assessing her 
ability as being above her prior but below her signal. Thus, if faced with gambles 
involving high known and unspecified probabilities, she should be “regressive” and 
choose the gamble with known probabilities.  By parallel logic, participants facing 
gambles with low known probabilities should choose the gambles with unspecified 
probabilities. 
 Participants.  There were 58 participants with an average age of 20.8 years; 46% 
were male. On average, participants earned 6.88 €.   
Results of Experiment 3.  Five of the 58 participants did not wish to continue 
beyond the quiz to the choices.  Thus, we were left with 53 participants, 27 in the hard 
and 26 in the easy conditions. As shown in Table 1, participants in the hard conditions 
were, on average, overconfident in the sense of estimation and participants in the easy 
condition underconfident (3.56 vs. -1.50, t = 7.00, p< .001). This replicates the results of 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
Table 2 (lower middle section) reports results in terms of participants’ mean pre- 
and post-feedback uncertainty scores broken down by the hard and easy conditions. In 
addition to showing results for the whole sample (total), we also show separately the 
results of those participants who faced known probabilities greater than 0.5 (p>0.50) and 
those who faced probabilities less than or equal to 0.5 (p≤0.50). 
The “total” results are similar to Experiment 1. At the pre-feedback stage, the 
means of the two sub-groups (3.26 and 3.00) are neither significantly different from each 
other (t=0.43, ns) nor from 3.00 (t=0.60 and 0.01, respectively, ns). That is, on average 
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there is no over- or underplacement in either the hard or easy sub-groups. At the same 
time, the placement decisions following feedback are in accordance with the Bayesian 
model and supported by statistical analysis. Specifically, the regression of the difference 
between pre- and post-feedback scores on the hard/easy condition reveals a significant 
coefficient for the latter (t= 2.90, p =.005).   
On the other hand, there is a striking distinction between participants who faced 
known probabilities larger and smaller than 0.50.  Participants for whom p>0.50 chose 
predominantly the known probabilities as witnessed by their low uncertainty scores (1.62 
and 1.69 for the hard and easy sub-groups, respectively).  Both means were significantly 
different from 3.00 (t=3.07 and 2.57, p<.01) but not from each other (t =0.11, p=.911).  
Participants for whom p ≤ 0.50 chose predominantly the unspecified probabilities 
as witnessed by their high uncertainty scores (4.79 and 4.31 for the hard and easy sub-
groups, respectively).  Both means were significantly different from 3.00 (t=4.59 and 
2.78, p<.01) but not from each other (t= 0.78, p=.911). 
Participants were also differentially sensitive to feedback.  For p >0.50, there was 
no effect on uncertainty scores of the interaction captured by the regression of the 
difference between pre- and post-feedback scores on the hard easy/condition (t = 0.87, 
ns). However, for those for whom p ≤ 0.50, the coefficient of the analogous regression 
was significant (t=3.30, p=.003).  
Discussion of Experiment 3.  The results of Experiment 3 add to the evidence on 
the hard-easy effect for estimation:  overestimation for the hard condition and 
underestimation for the easy condition.  At the aggregate level, the data also replicate 
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Experiment 1 in terms of no over- or underplacement and participants’ responses are 
consistent with the Bayesian model following feedback. 
However, the picture is quite different for participants who faced known 
probabilities greater or smaller than 0.50.  The former showed a strong tendency to avoid 
gambles with unspecified probabilities whereas the latter predominantly chose them. In 
other words, those facing probabilities greater than 0.50 exhibited underplacement and 
those facing probabilities below 0.50 exhibited overplacement. This differential behavior 
of participants facing low (p ≤ 0.50) and high (p > 0.50) known probabilities is, of course, 
consistent with the arguments of “regressive” reasoning outlined above. Moreover, these 
tendencies were observed irrespective of whether participants were over- or 
underconfident in the sense of estimation. 
 As is well known, contextual effects have frequently been shown to influence the 
expression of preference (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). What then might be the effect of 
different frames when people make judgments concerning placement?  This was the 
purpose of Experiment 4.  
 
Experiment 4  
Design, procedure, and choice tasks. Experiment 4 was exactly like Experiment 1 
with one exception.  Participants did not simply choose between gambles that, on one 
hand, had known “0.50/0.50” probabilities and, on the other, unspecified probabilities 
that depended on how well they answered the quiz compared to their fellow participants. 
Instead, participants had to rank order (by preference) the following four outcomes: (1) A 
“sure thing” of 0.75€; (2) The gamble with “0.50/0.50” probabilities (as in Experiment 
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1); (3) The gamble with unspecified probabilities where no information was provided 
about the probabilities (so-called “ambiguity,” Ellsberg, 1961); and (4) The gamble with 
unspecified probabilities where, as in Experiment 1, the probabilities depended on how 
well participants had answered the quiz compared to their fellow participants. 
From a formal viewpoint, we note that the comparison between the second and 
fourth alternatives implies identical choices to those examined in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Thus, consistency would lead one to expect no over- or underconfidence in terms of 
placement.   
Participants.    There were 64 participants with an average age of 20.6 years; 44% 
were male. On average, participants earned 7.93€.   
Results of Experiment 4. The right hand panel of Table 1 presents the results 
concerning estimation. As in Experiments 1, 2, and 3, participants in the hard sub-group 
are overconfident (mean of 1.77) whereas those in the easy sub-group are underconfident 
(mean of -1.70). Moreover, these means are significantly different from each other 
(t=3.94, p<.001). 
The bottom sections of Appendix B and Table 2 report the data relevant to 
placement. Unlike Experiments 1, 2, and 3, however, we do not report the results of 
direct binary choices between gambles involving known and unspecified probabilities but 
infer these decisions from participants’ rank orderings of the four choice alternatives 
enumerated above.  There are two striking results. 
First, the data exhibit considerable underplacement, i.e., underconfidence. For the 
pre-feedback choices, there are no differences in mean uncertainty scores between the 
hard and easy sub-groups (1.20 vs. 1.59, t = 0.77, p = 0.446) but these are both 
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significantly smaller than the 3.00 that would imply no over- or underplacement (t = 5.00 
and 4.03, p<.001).  
Second, although participants are not acting as though their average performance 
is equal to the mean of the group at the pre-feedback stage, they do adjust their choice 
strategies subsequently in accordance with the direction of their feedback. In the hard 
sub-group, this decreases from a mean uncertainty score of 1.20 to 1.10 (t= 0.40, p = 
0.693); whereas in the easy sub-group this increases from 1.59 to 2.85 (t = -3.83, p < 
.001).4  Interestingly, the post-feedback choices of the easy sub-group reveal no over- or 
underplacement (2.85 is not significantly different from 3.00, t=0.39). As might be 
expected, testing this interaction by regressing the difference between pre- and post-
feedback scores on the hard/easy condition reveals a significant beta coefficient (t=3.22, 
p=.002). 
Finally, unlike Experiment 1, there was no differential self-selection into the 
experimental task. All of the participants elected to do the choice task after completing 
the quiz.  We have no explanation for the differences between the two experiments in this 
respect. 
 Discussion of Experiment 4.  The key – and surprising – result of Experiment 4 is 
the strong underplacement that is apparently induced by the rank ordering of choice 
alternatives as opposed to direct choices between gambles involving known and 
unspecified probabilities (as in Experiments 1, 2, and 3).  These results are even more 
surprising in that a large majority of participants (73%) checked the mid-point of “similar 
to others” when asked in the post-experimental questionnaire to assess their skill in 
                                                 
4 Whereas the result is statistically significant in the easy sub-group, this is not the case in the hard sub-
group. One reason for the latter could be a floor effect, i.e., there is little room to be even more “uncertainty 
averse” as one moves from the pre-feedback to the post-feedback condition. 
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answering the general knowledge questionnaire relative to their peers. Also the mean 
estimate of their percentiles in the distribution of scores was 0.47. In other words, when 
explicitly asked, participants assessed themselves as being, on average, no different than 
their colleagues. 
 The results of this experiment can be viewed from two perspectives. One is the 
relation between estimation and placement; the other is the effect of numbers of 
alternatives on revealed preferences. As to the former, the results suggest that the   
relation between tasks involving estimation and placement are subject to framing effects.  
Although interesting, this considerably complicates making any general statements. 
As to the latter, the finding of greater uncertainty avoidance (or “risk aversion”) 
can be related to two literatures. One concerns findings in the animal literature that 
certain birds – common starlings – show less risk aversion when faced with binary 
choices as opposed to multiple alternatives (Schuck-Paim & Kacelnik, 2007). The 
explanatory hypothesis is that most animal choices are binary in nature, e.g., eat versus 
do not eat. They do not involve choosing one of many alternatives, e.g., which of k (>2) 
alternative foods to eat.  When confronted by many alternatives, animals are confused 
and either delay choice or seek safer options.  
The second literature relates to the so-called “paradox of choice” (Iyengar & 
Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2004). This refers to the fact that the satisfaction people derive 
from choice does not necessarily increase with the number of alternatives they face (if 
anything, it is an inverted U-shaped function, Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2008). This has 
important implications in applied settings. For example, when faced with many 
alternatives for investing in pension funds, people have been found to delay choice, even 
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when this reduces their financial returns (Iyengar, Jiang, & Huberman, 2004). In general, 
this literature emphasizes the dysfunctional aspects of having “too many” choice 
alternatives that can result in dissatisfaction, excessive risk aversion, and   
procrastination. The relation between our results and these findings clearly demands 
further investigation. 
  
General Discussion 
 Summary. In all of our four experiments participants exhibited over- and 
underconfidence in the sense of estimation, based on responses to hard and easy tasks 
respectively.  This replicated results in the literature (see e.g., Juslin et al., 2000) and was 
consistent with the regression hypothesis proposed by Moore and Healy (2008). The 
picture, however, was not so clear concerning over- and underconfidence in the sense of 
placement and is summarized in Table 3.   
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 The upper panel (A) of Table 3 reports the results of regressing pre-feedback 
uncertainty scores for all four experiments on the different experimental manipulations.  
Consider Model 1 in the first column. The constant term estimates the mean uncertainty 
score across all experiments independent of their separate effects. The estimate of 3.90 
(standard error of 0.63) is not significantly different from 3.00 that represents no overall 
effect of over- or underplacement.   
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 Second, there is no effect due to whether participants faced unspecified 
probabilities based on their own performance or that of a randomly selected other (Self 
vs. Other, Experiment 2).  
 Third, there was a strong effect when participants faced “0.50/0.50” or 
“specifically tailored” probabilities (Fixed vs. Variable Probabilities, Experiment 3). 
  Fourth, the framing effect of expressing preferences in terms of binary choices as 
opposed to rank ordering preferences was also significant (Experiment 4).   
 Fifth, there was no effect overall if participants had taken the hard or easy 
versions of the quiz. In other words, at an aggregate level, the previous effects were 
independent of whether participants were over- or underconfident in the sense of 
estimation.   
 Finally, in Model 2 (the second column) we consider individual confidence scores 
(estimated vs. actual quiz scores) as an additional explanatory variable. At the individual 
level, overconfidence (in the sense of estimation) does increase uncertainty scores 
significantly but marginally (explaining only an additional 2% of variance).   
 The lower panel (B) of Table 3 provides a similar analysis for reactions to 
feedback.  In Model 1, the difference between pre- and post-feedback uncertainty scores 
is regressed on the different experimental conditions. As can be seen, the effect for “hard 
vs. easy” (that captures changes consistent with the Bayesian hypothesis) is highly 
significant (t = 6.48).  This effect, of course, is over and above smaller effects for “Fixed 
vs. Variable Probabilities” and “Binary Choice vs. Rank Order.”  The fact that there is no 
significant effect for “Self vs. Other” supports our earlier analysis that although 
participants in the “own score” condition changed their responses in accordance with the 
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Bayesian hypothesis, those in the “random other” also changed but should not have done 
so (Experiment 2). Finally, as in panel A, we include the effect of individual confidence 
in Model 2 (second column).  This has a strong effect, accounting for some 10% of 
additional variance, and documents stronger reactions to feedback by those who were 
revealed to be most overconfident (in the sense of estimation).  
 Implications. The main result of our work centers on the difference between 
overconfidence in the senses of estimation and placement.  Whereas the former can be 
relatively easily explained in terms of the regression hypothesis (Moore & Healy, 2008), 
this is not true of the latter.  
 For predicting placement, an important assumption of the regression hypothesis is 
that the person knows more about her performance than that of others. However, this may 
not be the only way in which people think about the problem of placement. For example, 
in our task it may be cognitively simpler for a person just to assume that her performance 
is, on average, no different from the mean of her peers. Indeed, this is consistent with the 
results of Experiments 1 and 2 where there was no over- or underplacement and even if 
results depended on the performance of a randomly selected other.   
 In Experiment 3 participants were confronted with known probabilities that 
differed from 0.50 and thus could not simply compare themselves with the median peer.  
Interestingly, what we observed was regressive behavior. When faced with a choice 
between gambles characterized by low known probabilities, on the one hand, and 
unspecified probabilities, on the other hand, there was a strong tendency to choose the 
latter. Similarly, choices between gambles involving high known probabilities versus 
unspecified probabilities led to choosing the former.  
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 Experiment 4 demonstrated extreme underplacement when participants’ choices 
were inferred from the rank ordering of four alternatives.  As noted above, this framing 
effect cannot be explained by the regression hypothesis and suggests broader questions 
such as the effects of numbers of choice alternatives on attitudes toward risk.    
 In many applied settings people do receive “signals” about their ability prior to 
entering competitive situations. Consider, for example, students who can assess their 
abilities based on past examinations or athletes who can review past performance prior to 
competition.  Our experimental paradigm modeled these kinds of situations by observing 
how participants took account of feedback after the first set of decisions. In general, our 
participants acted in accordance with a Bayesian updating model except when decisions 
involved the performance of a randomly chosen colleague.  We suspect that, for this 
decision, reasoning in the shoes of another involved too much complexity. This 
hypothesis should be investigated in future work. 
 Finally, we note that many studies have reported significant overconfidence in the 
area of entrepreneurial entry decisions (see, e.g., Cooper, Wu, & Dunkelberg, 1988; 
Bernardo & Welch, 2001; Koellinger, Minniti, & Schade, 2007).  Moreover, there is 
increasing awareness of different types of overconfidence and that it is particularly 
misplacement that leads to erroneous decisions (Wu & Knott, 2006).  In this paper we 
have not studied the effects of overconfidence in the sense of precision and thus do not 
comment on its importance relative to the other types of overconfidence. However, we 
suspect that much more can be gained in the future by concentrating efforts to identify 
the role of factors than determine placement as opposed to estimation.5   
                                                 
5 For an intriguing an analysis of the meaning of overconfidence in the sense of placement, see Benoît and 
Dubra (2008). 
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   Table 1: Overconfidence (overestimation) for hard and easy tests  
      
      
  Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 
    Own score Random other   
      
  Hard Easy  Hard Easy  Hard Easy  Hard Easy Hard Easy 
  (n=25) (n=27)  (n=15) (n=16)  (n=13) (n=13)  (n=27) (n=26) (n=30) (n=34) 
      
Mean test score 8.36 13.52  6.67 14.19  6.23 14.38  7.37 13.92  8.13 13.62 
                
                
Mean of estimated test scores 10.76 11.67  9.67 12.75  10.54 11.92  10.93 11.42  9.90 11.92 
                
                
Overconfidence1 2.40 -1.85   3.00 -1.44   4.31 -2.46   3.56 -2.50  1.77 -1.70 
               
t-statistic: Hard vs. Easy 4.86  4.35 5.13 7.00  3.84
  p< .001  p< .001 p< .001 p< .001  p< .001
      
 1 Positive values indicate overconfidence (overestimation); negative values indicate underconfidence (underestimation) 
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Table 2. Uncertainty scores for Experiments 1 - 4: Means/<standard errors>
Sub-groups Total
Experiment 1 Hard Easy
Pre-feedback 3.16 2.63 2.88
<0.37> <0.35> <0.25>
Post-feedback 1.72 3.78 2.79
<0.35> <0.33> <0.29>
Experiment 2
Own score
Pre-feedback 2.93 3.06 3.00
<0.25> <0.52> <0.29>
Post-feedback 2.60 3.13 2.87
<0.51> <0.46> <0.34>
Random other
Pre-feedback 3.31 2.69 3.00
<0.51> <0.40> <0.32>
Post-feedback 3.08 3.46 3.27
<0.56> <0.46> <0.36>
Experiment 3
Total: Pre-feedback 3.26 3.00 3.13
<0.43> <0.43> <0.30>
Post-feedback 2.11 3.62 2.85
<0.45> <0.40> <0.32>
p > 0.50: Pre-feedback 1.62 1.69 1.65
<0.45> <0.51> <0.33>
Post-feedback 1.62 2.38 2.00
<0.55> <0.55> <0.39>
  
p < 0.50: Pre-feedback 4.79 4.31 4.56
<0.39> <0.47> <0.30>
Post-feedback 2.57 4.85 3.67
<0.71> <0.32> <0.45>
  
Experiment 4
Pre-feedback 1.20 1.59 1.41
<0.36> <0.35> <0.20>
Post-feedback 1.10 2.85 2.03
<0.33> <0.38> <0.18>  
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Table 3. Regressions involving all experiments
A. Dependent variable: Uncertainty score
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Constant 3.90 6.23 3.89 6.27
Self vs.Other -0.03 -0.08 0.01 0.02
Fixed vs. Variable Probabilities  -5.05 -5.98 -4.69 -5.53
Binary Choice vs. Rank Order1 1.56 5.75 1.52 5.68
Hard vs. Easy2 0.13 0.54 -0.29 -0.98
Confidence x x 0.09 2.38
R2 0.25 0.27
n 226 226
B. Dependent variable: Difference between pre- and post-feedback uncertainty score
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Constant -0.82 -1.29 -0.86 -1.44
Self vs.Other 0.44 1.14 0.53 1.46
Fixed vs Variable probabilities  -1.96 -2.28 -1.15 -1.41
Binary Choice vs. Rank Order1 0.75 2.72 0.67 2.59
Hard vs. Easy2 1.57 6.48 0.63 2.22
Confidence x x 0.20 5.59
R2 0.20 0.30
n 226 226
Note: Coefficients significant at p <.001 are in bold; those underlined are 
significant at p <.05.
1 Binary Choice = 1; Rank Order = 0.
2 Hard = 1; Easy = 0.
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Figure 1.  Judgments of self and others across task complexity 
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Appendix A – Experimental instructions for Experiment 1 
(Translated from Spanish) 
Thank you for participating in this experiment about decision making behavior 
that is part of a research project.  What you earn will depend on your skill as well as the 
skill of your peers. 
Please follow the instructions carefully.  You have the opportunity to gain more 
than the 3 € that are already assured by your participation in the experiment.  As from 
now until the end of the experiment you are not allowed to talk amongst yourselves. 
Raise your hand if you have a question and one of the instructors will attend to you. 
Please, do not ask in a loud voice.  Thank you. The rules are the same for all participants. 
 
Experimental procedure 
The experiment consists of 3 phases. 
Phase 1 consists of a set of 20 general knowledge questions.  Each question is 
independent of the others. For each question, you have to decide between A and B.∗  
Your earnings at the end of the experiment depend on the accuracy of your responses. 
You will earn 0.25 € for each question that you answer correctly.  
Phase 2 is optional.  You can 
• claim all the money that you have earned up to this point (that is, the 
initial 3 € and what you earned from the questionnaire) and go directly to Phase 3 or 
• modify your earnings by way of considering 12 pairs of gambles ( 2 
groups of 6 pairs) and for each pair choosing one of two possible options.  You have to 
decide between Option 1 and Option 2  for the 12 pairs of gambles. The gambles give 
you the chance to gain or lose  certain sums of money.  Each gamble involves different 
amounts of euros: you can gain between 3 and 5 euros and lose between 1 and 3 euros.  
The chances of winning or losing in these gambles can be the same for all the participants 
or depend on your own skill – compared to the skill of your peers – in the questionnaire 
of Phase 1. 
                                                 
∗  These are the instructions for the “easy” experimental condition. In the “hard” condition, participants had 
to choose one of five possible answers. 
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After you have chosen between each pair of gambles, one of the gambles that you 
have chosen will be selected and you will face the consequences of that gamble. The 
money depending on the outcome of this gamble will be added to (if you win) or 
subtracted from (if you lose) your earnings from Phase 1 (that is the initial 3 € plus your 
earnings from the questionnaire). Thus, when you choose each gamble, remember that it 
can be the one that is selected and that your final earnings can depend on its outcome! 
In Phase 3, we ask you to complete a general questionnaire.  
 
Phase 1 
This phase consists of 20 multiple-choice questions.  For all the questions you 
have to decide between A and B. (See last footnote.*) Your earnings depend on the 
correctness of your responses: you will receive 0.25 € for each correct answer.  You have 
a maximum of 45 seconds to give each response:  if you indicate no choice between A 
and B, your answer will be considered wrong. 
At the end of this questionnaire, we will ask you to estimate the number of 
questions you answered correctly. 
 
Phase 2 
This phase is optional. You can decide between: 
(a) keeping all the money you have earned up until now (that is the initial 3€ 
plus your earnings from the questionnaire) and go directly to Phase 3; or 
(b) participate in a game where you can influence your own earnings by way of 
choosing between two gambles, called Option 1 and Option 2, for 12 pairs of gambles. 
The gambles give you the possibility of winning between 3 and 5 euros and losing 
between 1 and 3 euros.  Your probability of winning or losing in these gambles can be the 
same as the probabilities for your peers (Option 1) or can depend on how well you 
answered the questionnaire in Phase 1 relative to your peers (Option 2).  Your probability 
of winning will be equal to your percentile.  Specifically, if you were at the 90th 
percentile of the distribution of points, your probability of winning would be 0.90;  if you 
were at the 50th percentile of the distribution of points, your probability of winning would 
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be 0.50 (that is at the middle); if you were at the 30th percentile of the distribution of 
points, your probability of winning would be 0.30; and so on. 
Remember that your percentile indicates the percentage of participants who 
obtained fewer points than you! 
All the participants have the same opportunity. 
If you choose (a), go to Phase 3. 
If you choose (b), you have to decide between Option 1 and Option 2 for each 
pair of gambles. At the end, one of the gambles that you have chosen will be drawn at 
random and your final earnings will depend on the outcome of that gamble. 
 
Phase 3 
In the third phase we ask you to complete a general questionnaire. One of the 
instructors will give it to you.  
 
When you have completed the general questionnaire of Phase 3, we will give you 
the sum that you have earned in Phases 1 and 2 plus the fixed fee of 3€. 
Thank you for your participation! 
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Appendix B.  Proportions of participants preferring gambles with unspecified probabilities: Experiments 1-4
Uncertainty
n 3:-1 vs. 3:-1 3:-1 vs.4:-2 3:-1 vs. 5:-3 4:-2 vs. 4:-2 4:-2 vs. 5:-3 5:-3 vs. 5:-3 Mean score (mean)
Experiment 1
Pre-feedback
Hard sub-group 25 0.56 0.40 0.48 0.72 0.44 0.56 0.53 3.16
Easy sub-group 27 0.52 0.33 0.41 0.52 0.41 0.44 0.44 2.63
Total 52 0.54 0.37 0.44 0.62 0.42 0.50 0.48 2.88
Post-feedback
Hard sub-group 25 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.43 1.72
Easy sub-group 27 0.58 0.52 0.57 0.49 0.54 0.56 0.54 3.78
Total 52 0.51 0.47 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 2.79
Experiment 2
Own score
Pre-feedback
Hard sub-group 15 0.47 0.40 0.60 0.40 0.47 0.60 0.49 2.93
Easy sub-group 16 0.44 0.50 0.63 0.50 0.63 0.38 0.51 3.06
Total 31 0.45 0.45 0.61 0.45 0.55 0.48 0.50 3.00
Post-feedback
Hard sub-group 15 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.49 0.48 2.60
Easy sub-group 16 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.46 0.52 0.51 3.13
Total 31 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.49 2.87
Random other
Pre-feedback
Hard sub-group 13 0.46 0.54 0.69 0.31 0.69 0.62 0.55 3.31
Easy sub-group 13 0.54 0.23 0.38 0.62 0.46 0.46 0.45 2.69
Total 26 0.50 0.38 0.54 0.46 0.58 0.54 0.50 3.00
Post-feedback
Hard sub-group 13 0.46 0.56 0.54 0.49 0.51 0.46 0.50 3.08
Easy sub-group 13 0.49 0.56 0.51 0.54 0.46 0.60 0.53 3.46
Total 26 0.47 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.52 3.27
Experiment 3
Total: Pre-feedback
Hard sub-group 27 0.59 0.56 0.48 0.52 0.56 0.56 0.55 3.26
Easy sub-group 26 0.46 0.46 0.35 0.69 0.50 0.54 0.50 3.00
Total 53 0.53 0.51 0.42 0.60 0.53 0.55 0.52 3.13
Post-feedback
Hard sub-group 27 0.37 0.41 0.37 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.35 2.11
Easy sub-group 26 0.62 0.50 0.50 0.62 0.69 0.69 0.60 3.62
Total 53 0.49 0.45 0.43 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.47 2.85
p>0.50: Pre-feedback
Hard sub-group 13 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.08 0.39 0.15 0.27 1.62
Easy sub-group 13 0.46 0.15 0.08 0.46 0.15 0.39 0.28 1.69
Total 26 0.39 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 1.65
  
Post-feedback  
Hard sub-group 13 0.31 0.39 0.39 0.15 0.23 0.15 0.27 1.62
Easy sub-group 13 0.46 0.31 0.39 0.31 0.46 0.46 0.40 2.38
Total 26 0.39 0.35 0.39 0.23 0.35 0.31 0.34 2.00
 
p<0.50 Pre-feedback  
Hard sub-group 14 0.86 0.79 0.57 0.93 0.71 0.93 0.80 4.79
Easy sub-group 13 0.46 0.77 0.62 0.92 0.85 0.69 0.72 4.31
Total 27 0.67 0.78 0.59 0.93 0.78 0.82 0.76 4.56
 
Post-feedback  
Hard sub-group 14 0.43 0.43 0.36 0.50 0.36 0.50 0.43 2.57
Easy sub-group 13 0.77 0.69 0.62 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.81 4.85
Total 27 0.59 0.56 0.48 0.70 0.63 0.70 0.61 3.67
Experiment 4
Pre-feedback
Hard sub-group 30 0.23 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.20 0.13 0.20 1.20
Easy sub-group 34 0.21 0.21 0.29 0.35 0.21 0.33 0.27 1.59
Total 64 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.21 0.23 0.24 1.41
Post-feedback
Hard sub-group 30 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.19 1.10
Easy sub-group 34 0.50 0.53 0.38 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.48 2.85
Total 64 0.36 0.34 0.26 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.34 2.03  
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